Do you actually know how many working keys exist for your vehicle?
We are frequently told that “relay theft” is becoming the norm for modern vehicles. Really?
- Who knows?
- Based upon what data?
- And how is that conclusion reached?
The language is now familiar:
- “Security bypass”
- “Electronic compromise”
- “Professional organised gangs”
But in many reported vehicle removals, there is no forensic evidence establishing precisely how the vehicle was started or driven away. So the question becomes:
What are we actually measuring?
Keyless … or Key-Based?
Before concluding ‘electronic circumvention’, other possibilities deserve consideration:
- Was a third key ever issued?
- Has a replacement key been programmed at some point?
- Is an original key unaccounted for?
- Could an authorised key have been used?
These may be uncomfortable questions. But they are evidentially relevant ones.
In many cases, the only firm fact is this:; the vehicle is reported taken without obvious signs of forced entry. From there, the narrative can quickly move to “security bypass”.
Yet absence of visible damage, even combined with the presence of keys, is not proof of relay theft.
The Data Problem
Police forces do not generally record, in a structured, retrievable format, the precise mechanism of vehicle removal. In many instances, that would be extremely difficult to establish without forensic recovery. As a result, large-scale statistics about ‘keyless theft’ may be derived from:
- Victim accounts
- Crime categorisation practices
- Industry commentary
- Media reporting
None of which can reliably distinguish between:
- Electronic relay attack
- CAN bus compromise
- Key cloning
- Legitimate programmed key use
- Straightforward key access
The term ‘security compromise’ suggests sophisticated technical conduct. Where such conduct occurs, it should be described as such. But without evidence of the specific removal mechanism, the description can rest on inference.
And inference, repeated often enough, can harden into accepted narrative.
A Possible Shift in Risk?
There is commentary suggesting that as some vehicles become harder to remove electronically from driveways, certain offenders may revert to entering properties to obtain keys. If substantiated, that would represent a more serious personal safety risk for households.
But again, distinguishing trend from perception requires structured evidence.
Manufacturers: Not Off the Hook
This is not an argument that manufacturers bear no responsibility. Vehicle security weaknesses clearly exist, and some models have demonstrably been easier to exploit than others. However, attributing every unexplained removal to relay theft risks oversimplifying a more complex picture – one that may involve:
- Key issuance and management practices
- Replacement key controls
- Aftermarket programming
- Insurance processes
- Data recording limitations
- The complexities inherent in insurance-linked reporting
In any insurance-linked crime category, there is also a recognised need for careful verification processes. That reality does not imply wrongdoing in any individual case, but it does underline why mechanism matters.
Without clarity on how vehicles are actually being removed, prevention strategies, accountability discussions and public messaging risk resting on incomplete foundations.
The Uncomfortable Truth
The most honest position may be this:
- We do not reliably know the proportion of vehicles taken by relay attack versus other methods.
- If we do not know, public messaging and policy may be shaped by assumption rather than measurement.
This is not to deny that relay theft exists. It is to question whether it has been properly quantified.
Because before asking “How vulnerable is your vehicle?”
Perhaps we should first ask “How many keys exist for it?”