Repatriation Case Studies

A. Case Study: Recovered Cloned Vehicle – Lithuania

A vehicle bearing a UK vehicle registration mark (VRM) was located and seized by authorities in Lithuania. While the car appeared, at first glance, to be legitimately registered in the United Kingdom, the situation quickly revealed signs of fraudulent activity.

The registration number matched a similar vehicle actively being driven in the UK by an unsuspecting owner. However, in contrast to many cloning operations, the vehicle’s Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) – including the visible VIN displayed on the windscreen – had not been tampered with. This indicated a relatively unsophisticated method of identity alteration: a straightforward plate-swap, without any physical modification to the identity or documentation.

Lithuanian authorities, with access to the UK’s stolen vehicle database, were able to quickly identify the discrepancy and seize the vehicle. Despite this, apparently no notification was made to the UK police, nor to the insurer who had previously settled a claim for the theft of the original vehicle. The UK police also appeared unaware that the vehicle had been recovered abroad, as no contact was initiated with any relevant stakeholders.

Instead, the situation came to light through a repatriation agent who discovered that the vehicle was in custody. The agent subsequently informed the insurer, who then appointed a representative to initiate liaison with the necessary parties in both jurisdictions.

Understandably, the Lithuanian authorities required formal documentation to proceed: evidence of the original theft in the UK, and confirmation of the insurer’s financial interest in the vehicle. Securing these documents, however, proved challenging. Requests to various UK agencies for assistance were met with limited cooperation, resulting in delays and administrative difficulty in assembling the required evidence.

This case illustrates both the benefits and the limitations of international vehicle crime detection. While shared database access enabled prompt identification of the clone, the lack of proactive communication between national authorities and insurers significantly hampered the recovery process.

When attempting to progress matters, we sought:

  1. The agreement for the sharing of
    a. the UK’s PNC LoS (VRM) records with other countries
    b. other countries sharing information with the UK
  2. The policy/procedure when the UK authorities are notified that a vehicle stolen in the UK has been recovered abroad
  3. The policy/procedure to be adopted by the country recovering/possessing the vehicle.
    Should this not be a general, all-encompassing, all-country, but individual to each
    policy, we sought the arrangement insofar as it pertains to Lithuania
  4. Any UK Interpol office contact, phone number and email for liaison about LoS vehicles
    located abroad

We received varying responses:

  • ACRO – ACRO Criminal Records Office – a national police unit responsible for managing and exchanging criminal record and biometric information both within the UK and internationally – no information held about sharing agreements
  • DfT – Department for Transport – ‘Following a thorough search of our paper and electronic records, I have established that the information you requested is not held by this Department. The information would ordinarily be held by either West Midlands Police* or Home Office, but given you have already approached these organisations, we can offer no further suggestions on whom you may approach for the information you seek’
    * WMP appear irrelevant. It appears this was more likely meant to be GMP, who have a relationship with Interpol
  • DVLA – ‘This information is not held by the DVLA‘.
  • Home Office – a response, via an MP that adds little, can be read here. The statement ‘We are also engaging with international partners to deepen our understanding of crossborder vehicle theft and to identify potential options for effective international collaboration‘, suggests this is a known issue that has yet to be resolved.
  • MoJ – the Ministry of Justice – ‘The MOJ does not hold any information in the scope of your request. This is because we are not the appropriate authority to contact on this subject. You may wish to contact the Department of Transport as they may hold some of the information you requested‘. Regarding the DfT, see above.
  • Met’ Police – did not liaise directly with Lithuania. Their response to a request for information, which provides some potentially useful detail, can be read here. A copy of the MPS Schengen Vehicle Alert
  • NPCC – the National Police Chiefs Council – as ACRO (above)
  • Our MP – see Home Office (above)

B. Case Study: Lost Marker Mismanagement and Intelligence Inertia

A vehicle reported stolen in the UK was temporarily removed from the Police National Computer (PNC) database as a “Lost or Stolen” (LoS) vehicle, following an incorrect assumption by the relevant police constabulary that it had been recovered domestically. This error was subsequently acknowledged, and the LoS marker was reinstated.

Upon seeking clarification, it was disclosed that the constabulary had received intelligence—originating from an unnamed law enforcement source—that the vehicle’s tracking device (TD) had activated in Pakistan. Despite this information, the constabulary made no attempt to liaise with Pakistani authorities. Their rationale was that the vehicle was outside UK jurisdiction, and thus outside the operational scope of the force. As one officer explained: “We wouldn’t do that. We would just leave that, as the vehicle is out of our force jurisdiction—well, it’s outside the UK.”

The constabulary confirmed that no further action would be taken. The officer in charge (OiC) stated that they were unable to obtain additional information and that, from their perspective, the investigation was concluded. The case was closed without further attempts to pursue the intelligence.

Notably, the information about the vehicle’s tracking signal in Pakistan appeared to have been disclosed inadvertently during follow-up inquiries. Had this not occurred, the tracking data may have remained unknown to the reporting party.

Despite this intelligence, the constabulary expressed no intention of revisiting the source of the data, stating: “As far as we’re concerned, we have no further lines of enquiry to be recovering that vehicle, and we wouldn’t recover that vehicle. It’s outside the UK. In terms of our investigation—it is closed. We won’t be doing anything further with it.”

The rationale for why the intelligence was forwarded to a constabulary unwilling or unable to act upon it remains unclear. The source of the alert was classified as an “intelligence source/log,” and no additional details were disclosed.

Suggestions were made to engage alternative channels for further investigation, including NaVCIS (National Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service). A formal request for further information has been submitted, and a response is currently pending

C. Case Study: ‘We do not want to upset the German Authorities‘

A crime allegation was formally recorded by a UK constabulary, and a crime number was issued in accordance with standard procedure. However, following further investigation, all parties – including law enforcement -concluded that the initial claim of vehicle theft was likely false.

The extent of such abuse is unknown; a crime number is not evidence of actual theft, it evidences someone being prepared to pick up the phone and convey information to a constabulary.

The incident involved a vehicle which the insured individual reported as having been left outside their residence one evening, only to be found missing the next morning. However, subsequent data revealed that the vehicle had, in fact, left the United Kingdom several days prior to the alleged theft date. This discrepancy cast serious doubt on the veracity of the claim!

The vehicle was later located and seized by authorities in Germany, where it may still remain. Despite these developments, no criminal charges were brought against the insured. According to the officer in charge (OiC), efforts to obtain formal statements or evidence from the German authorities were not pursued. The reason given was that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) had expressed concern requesting such evidence late in the investigation could potentially “undermine international relations,” and therefore advised against proceeding with prosecution.

Instead, police advised that a civil action may be a more appropriate path for the insurer, asserting that such an approach could be more effective in achieving a result. This recommendation is somewhat perplexing, given that both criminal and civil cases require similar evidentiary thresholds in allegations of fraud. Without access to the necessary evidence from Germany – evidence the police themselves deemed essential – civil proceedings may face the same legal and practical obstacles.

Moreover, there is now the potential risk that the insured party, having avoided criminal proceedings and not even receiving a formal caution, may initiate action against the insurer. The absence of a police-led prosecution may make it more difficult for the insurer to mount a robust defence, particularly if it is perceived that the claim was not thoroughly tested in court.

While the OiC may be available to act as a witness in civil proceedings, it is unclear whether the constabulary, given ongoing resourcing concerns, would be willing to facilitate the officer’s attendance in court. In this context, it appears that requesting assistance from German authorities to obtain the necessary evidence would have been the more appropriate and proportionate response – both to address the suspected criminal conduct and to support any subsequent legal proceedings.

06/10/2025 – Range Rover stolen in Harrogate is tracked down in Pakistan. Read more here.