The full chronology can be found at the post ‘A problem acknowledged — but how big is it?’
03/09/2026 to the NPCC
Subject: FoIA 3089/2026 / Internal Review 3103/2026 – clarification of section 14 reasoning
Thank you for completing the Internal Review.
I remain dissatisfied with the decision. The review makes a number of important concessions concerning the original refusal. It accepts that:
i. not all of the references originally relied upon were separate originating FoIA requests;
ii. my request has a genuine public-interest purpose;
iii. my motive is not improper;
iv. the request itself is courteous;
v. new evidence has emerged; and
vi. the previous ICO case described in the original refusal as involving “almost identical circumstances” was not, in fact, identical in wording or scope.
These are not insignificant points. They concern matters expressly relied upon to justify the original section 14 refusal and, in my view, demonstrate material defects in its factual presentation and reasoning.
You state:
“The original refusal perhaps overstated the degree of similarity.”
I do not understand the qualification “perhaps”.
The original refusal positively asserted that IC-387981-N0T4 concerned “almost identical circumstances”. The Internal Review now accepts that the request considered in that case “was not identical in wording or scope to the present request”.
This should be capable of a straightforward factual determination:
1. Did the original refusal overstate the degree of similarity, or did it not?
2. If the NPCC maintains that it did not, please explain why.
If it accepts that it did:
3. Please state this unambiguously and explain how that materially overstated characterisation came to be included in a formal refusal notice and relied upon in support of section 14.
This is not semantic criticism. The asserted similarity was expressly relied upon as part of the justification for refusing my statutory request. If that similarity was overstated, the NPCC relied upon a materially inaccurate characterisation of an earlier case when making an adverse decision about my present use of FoIA. The NPCC did so in the public domain.
That is particularly concerning given that the Internal Review states that the speed of the original decision was assisted by the NPCC’s “extensive organisational knowledge already held regarding the history of previous correspondence and the subject matter involved.”
If that organisational knowledge was sufficiently extensive to support the rapid application of section 14:
4. How did the NPCC nevertheless come to materially overstate the similarity of the very previous case upon which it relied, and how did the other factual inaccuracies now acknowledged by the review arise?
It is particularly concerning that a material fact relied upon to justify the section 14 refusal was overstated, thereby putting me to the time and trouble of identifying, challenging and seeking correction of it. Describing that now as something which “perhaps” occurred does not resolve the issue: either the original characterisation was accurate or it was not.
There is an obvious irony in relying upon the extent of my subsequent engagement as evidence of burden when part of that engagement has been necessitated by deficiencies in the NPCC’s own responses.
Nevertheless, section 14 continues to be maintained principally because my enquiries fall within the broad area of vehicle crime, Lost/Stolen records and their governance. That leaves an important question unanswered:
5. What legitimate FoIA request concerning my area of professional expertise could I now make to the NPCC which would not be refused because I have previously made requests concerning vehicles?
I readily accept that many of my requests broadly concern vehicle crime and collisions. Of course they do. But within that field they have concerned materially different subjects, including information disclosure, vehicle registration marks, PNC data, Lost/Stolen processes, funding, vehicle-theft investigation and, now, the specific VE602/VE602J mechanism and its national governance.
A common connection with vehicles does not, without more, demonstrate that the requests are repetitive.
The review now accepts that not all of the references relied upon in the original refusal were separate originating FoIA requests, and that the actual number of originating requests was lower than the number of references presented.
6. Please therefore identify the matters upon which the NPCC’s present section 14 decision actually relies, namely:
a. the number of substantive originating FoIA requests being relied upon;
b. the date of each;
c. the subject matter of each; and
d. in what material respect each is said to be similar to the present VE602/VE602J request, beyond falling within the broad field of vehicles or vehicle crime.
This is not a new FoIA request. I am asking for clarification of the factual basis and reasoning already relied upon to justify the existing section 14 decision.
Frequency also requires clarification. The review repeatedly relies upon “persistent engagement”, yet does not identify the frequency of the substantive originating requests upon which that conclusion rests.
If frequency is itself a material reason for treating otherwise legitimate requests as vexatious:
7. What frequency or interval does the NPCC consider would permit me to make a further FoIA request concerning a different aspect of my professional field of vehicle crime and collisions without my previous requests themselves causing section 14 to be applied?
8. If the answer is that no particular interval would alter the position because the decisive consideration is my previous engagement with the broad subject of vehicles, please say so expressly.
I appreciate that there is no statutory minimum interval between FoIA requests. That is precisely why I ask the question. The NPCC is relying upon frequency and persistence as part of its decision, and I need to understand what conduct it says has crossed the line and what future exercise of my statutory rights it considers permissible.
The present request arose from new information supplied by the Home Office, which expressly directed me to the NPCC. The reviewer accepts that this new evidence exists but has not explained why the emergence of materially new evidence and a new line of enquiry is insufficient to distinguish this request from earlier matters.
9. What is the material commonality between this particular VE602/VE602J request and the earlier requests upon which the NPCC relies that is sufficient to outweigh both the new information giving rise to the request and its acknowledged public-interest purpose?
This is not merely an issue concerning my FoIA rights. The information is sought to establish the scale and governance of a known process capable of causing genuinely stolen vehicles to cease to be recorded as stolen, with potential consequences for policing, victims, insurers, provenance enquiries and innocent purchasers.
FoIA should not become unavailable to a requester simply because he has expertise in, and continues to investigate, an unresolved subject of substantial public importance.
Yours,