11/09/2026
To: Jon Vale @ npcc.police.uk
Cc: Gavin Stephens @ npcc.police.uk
Subject: PNC Lost/Stolen “weeding” and VE602 – request for operational consideration and assistance establishing scale
Dear Chief Inspector Vale,
I am writing to ask that the following matter is placed before the appropriate national policing lead and, in particular, Assistant Chief Constable Sarah Grahame in her capacity as the NPCC Lead for Vehicle Crime.
I am deliberately approaching you outside the Freedom of Information Act process. This distinction is important. I am not presently asking the NPCC to accept that the operation of PNC Lost/Stolen “weeding” represents a substantial national failure, nor am I asking the NPCC FOI team to undertake another statutory information search. My difficulty is more fundamental.
The mechanism is now reasonably well established, but I have been unable to establish its scale.
The issue
I have been examining the PNC process under which a vehicle Lost or Stolen (LoS) report is initially created as unconfirmed. I became concerned LoS markers were routinely be falling off the PNC at 6 weeks due to not having been ‘confirmed’; due to this ‘weeding’ stolen vehicle were no longer recorded as such on the PNC and the DVLA were never (from the date of theft) made aware of the stolen status. Ultimately, I compared DVLA and police LoS notification – these can be found here – https://carcrime.uk/2025-dvla-police-stolen-notification-comparison/
The National Audit Office subsequently raised my concerns with the Home Office. Its letter of 25 June 2026 records the Home Office explanation that:
- the Lost/Stolen marker is initially unconfirmed;
- only once confirmed is that status included in the information made available to DVLA; and
- if the report remains unconfirmed after six weeks, it is removed from PNC through the process commonly referred to as “weeding”.
The Home Office also confirmed that this mechanism contributes to the difference between police and DVLA stolen-vehicle data. That stolen vehicles are not recorded as such due to an ‘admin oversight’ is a known problem.
There is a further important timing issue.
Until the Lost/Stolen report is confirmed, its stolen status is not passed to DVLA. Yet the VE602 reminder process appears to intervene substantially after the expected initial confirmation period, 48 hours, with reminders concerning records approaching eventual six-week weeding.
There is therefore potentially a period during which a vehicle has been reported stolen to police, but DVLA has not received the corresponding confirmed stolen status. Aside of the delay, ultimately, the DVLA may never be made aware of the stolen status. During that interval, DVLA processes may consequently continue without the benefit of that national stolen-vehicle marker.
I do not presently know how frequently this happens or whether the numbers are significant. That is precisely what I have been attempting to establish.
VE602 / VE602J
The Home Office subsequently confirmed that VE602 produces weekly report notifications which are sent to constabularies and that, contrary to an earlier response, the most recent four report runs are archived.
The Metropolitan Police has separately confirmed that VE602 reports are operational prompts intended to enable local record owners to act before automatic weeding, but that it does not centrally aggregate the statistics generated by the process.
Gwent Police provides a useful practical illustration. Following concerns I raised in 2024, the constabulary introduced a “confirm at notification” process intended to ensure that LoS reports were confirmed when created and thereby avoid the need for subsequent VE602/VE602J reminders.
That appears to demonstrate that a separate, later confirmation stage is not operationally essential: confirmation can be incorporated into the initial recording process.
However, Gwent’s safeguard remains a manual one and subsequent cases indicate that it can still be missed. That is particularly concerning because Gwent has also indicated that it does not have the resources routinely to monitor the subsequent two- and six-week reminder reports. In practical terms, if confirmation at creation is missed, the secondary safety net may also fail. Terminating the need to confirm would appear to have a further constabulary benefit; a reduction in the notification admin.
If “confirm at notification” operated perfectly, there should ordinarily be no unconfirmed Gwent records reaching the VE602/VE602J warning stages at all. The fact that apparent weeding has nevertheless continued is itself a reason to measure, rather than assume, the effectiveness of the safeguards.
The information I have been trying to establish is therefore comparatively simple:
- how many vehicle Lost/Stolen reports reach the first VE602 warning stage whilst still unconfirmed;
- how many reach the final six-week stage;
- how many are actually removed without ever having been confirmed;
- and, if possible, whether any subsequent audit determines what happened to those LoS removed vehicles.
Without those figures, neither I nor, as far as I can presently establish, anyone else can sensibly determine whether this is a minor administrative anomaly or an issue requiring national intervention.
Why I am approaching you rather than making another FOIA request
On 29 July 2026 I followed the Home Office’s express suggestion that the NPCC might be able to assist and submitted a narrowly framed request concerning VE602/VE602J and national assurance. That request was refused under section 14 FOIA.
I requested an Internal Review because the original refusal appeared to treat a broad collection of vehicle-related requests, Internal Reviews, appeals and correspondence as essentially one subject. The subsequent review maintained the refusal but materially qualified a number of aspects of the original reasoning. Amongst other matters, it recognised that the present request arose from new Home Office information, that not every reference relied upon represented a separate originating FOIA request, and that the request was materially concerned with the specific VE602/VE602J process rather than simply repeating a previous enquiry. The review also recognised the genuine public-interest dimension of the underlying issue.
I have therefore reached the position where continuing to pursue the same question through FOIA risks creating yet another argument about my use of FOIA rather than answering the underlying question. I would prefer to avoid that.
What I am asking the NPCC to do
I am therefore asking, in ordinary correspondence, whether the NPCC can assist in establishing the facts. Specifically, I would be grateful if this correspondence could be passed to ACC Sarah Grahame or the appropriate national operational owner, so that consideration can be given to:
- whether aggregate figures from recent VE602/VE602J reports can be made available or reviewed to establish the volume of unconfirmed Lost/Stolen records reaching the warning stages;
- whether any national or local data exists identifying how many such records ultimately reach six weeks and are automatically weeded;
- whether there is any existing national assurance, sampling or audit process capable of determining what subsequently happens to vehicles removed in that way; and
- if the information is held elsewhere, which body or operational function is best placed to establish the position.
I am not asking anyone at this stage to accept my conclusion.
I am asking for assistance obtaining the information needed to determine whether there is a conclusion to reach.
If the figures show that very few genuine stolen-vehicle records reach final weeding, that would provide important reassurance.
If they show a material number, the case for further operational consideration would speak for itself.
Previous notification
For completeness, I should mention that I raised the issue directly with the NPCC in 2024 and this resulted in an ‘all chief constable’ circular. However, the problem persisted. I subsequently wrote about the matter to ACC Grahame by LinkedIn message on 3 December 2025, referring to my discussions with Mark Kameen (NVCRP) and asking who within policing was able to address the process. My public chronology records that exchange – https://carcrime.uk/pnc-weeding-of-los-records-police-dvla-data-discrepancy/
I do not know what, if any, action followed that notification. I mention it simply because the concern is not new and because ACC Grahame’s national vehicle-crime role appears to make her the obvious person to whom I now ask that the developed evidence is referred.
I have brought together the chronology and principal source documents here – https://carcrime.uk/a-problem-acknowledged-but-how-big-is-it/
I will happily provide the NAO correspondence, Home Office responses and other source material directly if that assists.
I would be grateful for:
- acknowledgement that this has been received;
- confirmation that it has been passed to ACC Grahame/the appropriate national operational lead; and
- an indication whether national policing is willing to assist in establishing the scale of the issue.
I hope this approach avoids a further information-rights dispute and allows the underlying factual question to be considered on its merits.
Yours sincerely,
Philip Swift