PNC ‘Weeding’ of LoS Records – Police & DVLA Data Discrepancy

Contents

What is ‘weeding’

A detailed explanation can be found at the link below, but a brief overview can be found in the next page, provided by the National Audit Office (NAO).

In essence, it is the process by which, if a constabulary does not CONFIRM a LoS marker on the PNC, after 6 weeks, this marker falls away … the VRM is no longer recorded LoS – 1,000’s of vehicles are likely affected i.e. reported stolen but not recorded stolen.

A detailed account of the process can be read here, under the headings:

How Six-Week Weeding Operates (Day-by-Day) – the process
Is your stolen vehicle recorded as such – Check Again?
09/01/2026 – to the Home Office: Potential Systemic Under-Recording of Stolen Vehicles
03/2026 DVLA & PNC Data – how much has weeding contributed to the substantial discrepancy?
Preliminary National Indicators of Potential Weeding Impact
Weeding Caveats
- Prompt recovery
- Unconfirmed
The silo mentality
Weeding, Caveats & 2025 LoS Data
Preliminary National Indicators of Potential Weeding Impact
07/11/2024 – All Chief Constables Circular re ‘Weeding’
31/08/2024 – Scrap ‘six-week weeding’ of stolen vehicle VRMs
Is Automated Weeding Necessary?

The N.A.O – ‘Weeding leads to the discrepancy between Police & DVLA databases’

25^th June 2026, after years of raising concerns about weeding, the National Audit Office, the UK’s independent public spending watchdog wrote:

Reference GF 3845-26

POTENTIAL SYSTEMATIC UNDER-RECORDING OF STOLEN VEHICLES

Thank you for contacting the National Audit Office (NAO) setting out your concerns about the reporting of stolen vehicles. You raised concerns around the practice of “weeding”, whereby lost or stolen (LoS) markers are removed from vehicles when a report is not confirmed within six weeks.

Your correspondence has been passed to me as the NAO Director responsible for the Home Office. The NAO and the Comptroller & Auditor General (C&AG), who is head of the NAO, are both independent of government.

Our functions are to audit and express an opinion on the accounts of government departments and other central government bodies, and to carry out examinations into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which government departments and other public sector bodies have used their resources.

I read with interest the information you provided and my team has met with an official at the Home Office to discuss the matter.

As you set out, when a vehicle is reported as stolen to a local police force, an LoS marker is registered on the Police National Computer. The LoS marker is initially labelled as unconfirmed, enabling police officers to conduct due diligence before confirming that a theft has occurred. At that point the status is changed to confirmed. Only once an LoS marker is labelled as confirmed is it included in the report available to the DVLA. If the report remains unconfirmed after 6 weeks, it is removed from the PNC – the process known as
“weeding”.

The official my team spoke with confirmed that it is this process which leads to the discrepancy between the police and DVLA databases, with the police database including both unconfirmed and confirmed vehicle thefts and the DVLA database holding only the latter.

We asked the Home Office what remedial action it planned to take to address the data gap. You may be aware of the National Law Enforcement Data Service (LEDS), which we previously examined in our 2021 report, The National Law Enforcement Data Programme. This is a national policing system designed to replace the functionality provided by the Police National Computer.

The Home Office told my team that it is in discussions with police forces to understand whether it is appropriate to remove the LoS confirmation step from the new functionality being created through LEDS. Should this step be taken, it would remove the data discrepancy caused by “weeding” at the six-week mark. The official confirmed that there was no timetable for making this change.

You may be interested to consider a further source of data on vehicle theft: the Crime Survey for England and Wales. The relevant data for the most recent and other years are here: Nature of crime: vehicle-related theft – Office for National Statistics. These include data on the proportion of vehicles that, once stolen, are returned to their owners. The Office for National Statistics uses the Crime Survey to estimate the changing incidence of certain crimes over time. The data for vehicle theft, since 1981, are available in tables A1a and A1b here: Crime in England and Wales: Appendix tables – Office for National Statistics.

I do not intend to conduct further work on this matter at this time. However, given the importance of LEDS, it is possible we will consider the programme again in future.

Thank you again for bringing your interesting and informative research to our attention.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Tim Phillips,
Director, Home Affairs

THE CHRONOLOGY OF RAISING WEEDING CONCERNS

01/02/2023 – Surrey Police reminder

11/10/2023 FoIA request was made of Surrey police:

Please provide a copy of the ‘Routine Orders circulated on 1st February 2023: SURREY – Circulation of Stolen Vehicles on PNC =IMPORTANT Reminder for Investigating Officers and Staff’

27/11/2023, Surrey police provided a copy of the reminder issued 01/02/2023:

Investigating officers and staff are reminded please of the need to confirm stolen vehicles on PNC so they are retained beyond the initial period implemented via FCR fast-time updates via ICAD. Failure to do this can result in the ‘unconfirmed’ PNC circulation being deleted from the system after a 6-week period and opportunities to recover the vehicle being lost.

When a vehicle is reported Lost or Stolen, the investigating officer has the responsibility for updating PNC and the subsequent references on NICHE. This must be done by the submission of a Lost/Stolen Vehicle Message Switch (MSS) to Data Bureau. During the current indisposition of MSS on Windows 10, the contingency of sending an email to !Data Bureau with the necessary details applies.

Note: This raises a question – why was a reminder necessary? The answer – we had identified and alerted the constabulary to an example:

08/06/2023 – Surrey Police weeded VRM noted

08/06/2023 Surrey Police explained the process about a VRM having ‘fallen off’ the PNC LoS register (PSD/CO/2050/22). The force procedure for LoS vehicle reporting on PNC is as follows:

1. Loser reports to force (usually via telephone/ICAD[Incident Report]) and a ‘fast-time’ LOS vehicle report is created on PNC by FCR [Force Control Room] Contact. This is a PNC LOS report but at this stage remains unconfirmed so has a 6-week shelf life.

2. The ICAD is reviewed by Contact Centre for allocation/Filing. If the case is reported/created on NICHE [Police Information System] then Contact complete a Message Switch (MSS) form to Data Bureau with the details and Data Bureau update PNC with the latest details of the investigation, the NICHE Occurrence number (to replace the ICAD), the OIC and at that point the LOS is confirmed. As MSS is currently out of action following difficulties with the ICT platform, the contingency is in place force wide to email the information in, instead.

That is the basic process.

Following on from this, there is an additional data quality process for PNC reports called DAFs (Daily Activity Files). These are a high volume of prints that are sent from Hendon to Data Bureau each week which detail the reports we own on PNC in sections across Names, Vehicles and Property. In relation to Vehicles, amongst these reports, there is one that highlights vehicles with LOS reports which are coming to the end of their weed period.

On 24th January 2023, a member of staff emailed Data Bureau highlighting the issue of the vehicle concerned.

The vehicle appears to have had an unconfirmed LOS report entered on to PNC from the initial ICAD at 1430hrs on 9th December 2022. This means the weed date would have been 19th January 2023 if unconfirmed.

The report appears to have remained unconfirmed as no Message Switch or email was sent from Contact Centre to Data Bureau, therefore the report would have dropped off on 19th . Unfortunately, owing to a post-Xmas backlog of work in Data Bureau, the DAF report (additional weed safety net) was also not addressed in time so the report did weed and was re-entered on PNC as a result some 5 days after it had dropped-off.

As a result of this identified issue, a Routine Orders was circulated on 1st February 2023: SURREY – Circulation of Stolen Vehicles on PNC – IMPORTANT Reminder for Investigating Officers and Staff.

In addition, extra resources were allocated within Data Bureau to address the DAF backlog, which is now up to date.”

09/10/2023 – How Many Stolen Vehicles Are Not Recorded Stolen?

LinkedIn post

Friday 06/10/2023, a constabulary responded to our email of 4 days earlier which asked whether a stolen vehicle had actually been found. The Vehicle Registration Mark (VRM) had been on the PNC (Police National Computer) LoS (Lost or Stolen) register … but this was no longer the case.

The police had not informed the insured their car had been located. We asked the victim to contact the police mindful some constabularies remain reluctant to speak with adjusters and / or insurers. But the timing of the stolen marker removal made us suspicious. Sure enough …

Someone within the constabulary overlooked ‘confirming’ the theft allegation within 6 weeks of the theft being recorded. As a result, an automated ‘weeding’ procedure caused the VRM to be removed from the LoS register on or about the 42nd day after it was placed to the PNC.

The issue is occurring more frequently and we can only wonder how many vehicle theft allegations are subject to such behaviour in turn, how many stolen vehicles are no longer recorded LoS but should be.

On this occasion, there was no suggestion the weeding event had been conveyed to the officer in the case (OiC). What would have occurred if we had not alerted the constabulary to the change of status?

Unrecorded as LoS, the VRM would not alert if it passed an ANPR camera. Officers stopping the vehicle, even on false plates who identified the VRM, would not readily learn it was in fact a car reported stolen. The likelihood of recovery is reduced, if not close to, or actually, nil.

The concerns are not restricted to law enforcement activity. Vehicle Provenance (VP) companies who acquire and provide checks to the public, reporting in respect of the VRM, would inadvertently provide information that does not accurately reflect the stolen report. This could lead to subsequent claims against them; even if no financial damage arose, their reputation could be tainted.

If an innocent purchaser bought the vehicle when ‘clear’, following reinstatement to PNC LoS, they would likely be stopped, detained and police time engaged reconciling the issue. An innocent purchaser, not alerted to the true status, stands to lose all (N.E.M. vs Jones).

The situation creates more activity for adjusters, insurers and ultimately delays for the victim. In this instance, the OiC was not on duty. The officer who troubled to call had been required to undertake enquiries to establish the facts, determine whether the vehicle had been located and make contact, offering explanation and apology. Unable to confirm the situation with the OiC, they volunteered to reinstate the LoS marker on Friday.

Remarkably, in this technological age, LoS records do not transfer to VP companies in real-time. These public records showed ‘no stolen report’ against the VRM for a further 3 days!

Good news, we confirmed the reinstatement today … insured and client updated, and the delay … just a few days.

The extent of the problem can only be guessed at. To date, constabularies appear reluctant to share their weeding data. A constabulary explained they receive the weeded records, as a pdf, every fortnight.

Possibly the ‘source’ will be able to shed some light on this, a request has been submitted to the Home Office.

06/10/2023 FoIA request of the Home Office

PNC LoS Register VRM Weeding (of stolen vehicle records) – WDTK Link

Dear Home Office,

Please provide, month by month since 01/01/2022, together with the relevant constabulary name, in Excel format:

1. The number of VRMs weeded from the PNC LoS register i.e. had the LoS marker automatically removed after 6 weeks, the record having not been ‘confirmed’ and of those,

a. which were reinstated and
b. how long after did this reinstatement occur?

2. How many VRMs, as at today, are ‘weeded’ i.e. are off PNC LoS due to the weeding process?

To assist in locating and narrowing the data enquiry, I am concerned this ‘weeding’ is becoming more commonplace, that vehicles which should be recorded LoS on the PNC are ‘falling off’ and not being reinstated.

3. Do you hold any information that would indicate this weeding is occurring more frequently, the extent of the problem and what is being done to address it? If so, please supply this.

4. Please advise how vehicle data is held/organised and advise

a. what fields are available for search purposes and
b. what management reports can be generated with regard to VRM LoS records.

Yours faithfully,

2023 Home Office response – directed to the NPCC

As the Home Office acts as a processor in relation to vehicle data on the PNC, any information we hold in relation to question 4 is held on behalf of the police forces that use the system and therefore does not fall within the scope of the FOI Act.

Given the subject matter of your request, the National Police Chiefs’ Council may be able to assist you. Contact details can be found on the NPCC website at https://www.npcc.police.uk .

Link to the response

22/05/2029 – FoIA re Gwent Police & Weeding

Following our 22/05/2024 FoIA request of Gwent Police – WDTK link:

the constabulary instigated a new process upon receiving an LoS notification – see 09/10/2024 below – ‘Gwent new process’ (below)

29/05/2024 – LinkedIn: Vehicles – ‘REPORTED’ but not ‘RECORDED’ as stolen

LinkedIn Article by Philip Swift

Is the vehicle in respect of which you have made the settlement still recorded stolen? Our monitoring of the stolen status is plugging potential leakage:

Stolen vehicles ARE being placed on the Police National Computer (PNC) ‘Lost or Stolen’ (LoS) register, promptly. In many cases, this is the extent of the police action following an allegation of theft; recording a stolen marker against the Vehicle Registration Mark (VRM) and …. wait, hope. Will the vehicle, still on its original plate, be noted by a curtain-twitcher and a phone call made, or an Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) camera triggered, or will officers stop the vehicle on patrol?

All appear less likely these days and greatly depend upon the PNC recording the crime against the VRM, alerting to the stolen status if the VRM is checked.

However, in the background of PNC operations, an archaic process is grinding away; if, after 6 weeks, the constabulary fails to CONFIRM the LoS report, the stolen marker is ‘WEEDED’ and falls away. This is a frequent occurrence as evidenced by these ongoing matters:

Constabulary 1

‘We do not have a problem with weeding’ as we put a stop to the process, and instigated a procedure to prevent its occurrence.

We believe your policy needs to be reviewed. We are contacting you because a VRM has been weeded from the system!

The constabulary failed to engage further.

Constabulary 2

In 2023, following our contact, the constabulary circulated:

Investigating officers and staff are reminded please of the need to confirm stolen vehicles on PNC so they are retained beyond the initial period implemented via FCR fast-time updates via ICAD.
Failure to do this can result in the ‘unconfirmed‘ PNC circulation being deleted from the system after a 6-week period and opportunities to recover the vehicle being lost.

There you go, just as we have explained … ‘confirm or it clears’ and finding the vehicle is far less likely. But:

We returned to the constabulary with another, recent, example which they logged under a complaint and responded:

‘I have had replies from our Data management Team and would appear that it was as simple as an operator pressing the save button instead of the submit button’.

We understand an operator failed to press anything! The matter is being reviewed, with the constabulary explaining 05/2024;

‘due to the high workloads we currently have we cannot provide a formalised reply to your complaint for at least 6 months’.

Constabulary 3

We received an email:

I have been sent the email thread in relation to your queries regarding VRM [redacted].
The vehicle was reported stolen in 08/2023 as part of a series of commercial burglaries.
The vehicle was circulated as stolen and was not recovered and for clarification has still not been recovered.
You notified the insured the LoS marker was removed in 10/2023.
After 6 weeks unless instructed otherwise, the stolen marker drops off the system of the vehicle.
I was unaware that the relevant department had not been tasked at the time for marker to remain.
I was first made aware of this in 04/2024 hence the stolen marker being readded.
I was made aware of this by the aggrieved as he was said to have been informed the vehicle was not showing as stolen after trying to make claim, by you

The vehicle was removed from the PNC LoS register for about 6 months before our information was acted upon. We are asking whether, during this period, the VRM was checked on PNC, or by any Vehicle Provenance company.

As for the claim – well … those of you familiar with vehicle theft will likely be asking why the insured did not press the police for action as this would delay settlement. It was an ‘interesting’ claim, withdrawn.

Lessons to be learned …

Is the weeding process necessary or beneficial?
As an insurer, should you re-check the VRM after 6 weeks or let CMA do this?
As an insured, whose claim is being considered, your vehicle may drop off the PNC LoS register because it HAS been located – we will tell you and your insurers in the hope that you will be reunited with your vehicle as soon as possible. The storage days/costs are minimised.
If an insured whose claim has been declined, our involvement concluded, should we learn the vehicle has been removed from the PNC LoS register, we will still tell you – who knows, it may have been found, hopefully in ‘as was’ condition!

You can read more about CMA’s police safety net here.

29/07/2024 – FoIA to the NPCC re Weeding (254/2024)

PNC (VRM) LoS Weeding – WDTK link

please provide the information you hold about the 6-week auto-weeding of unconfirmed PNC LoS reports (theft of vehicle notifications), why this weeding is undertaken and any review of the process in the past 5 years.

20/08/2024 – NPCC Response – information not held

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST REFERENCE NUMBER: 254/2024 (WDTK response link)

The NPCC does not hold information captured by your request. This information engage S21 Information reasonably accessible to you.

For further information, please see Annex A.

The information you are seeking is detailed within the PNC User Manual at page 175 (9.1 Vehicle Reported Lost or Stolen (or Obtained by Deception)#VU.

As a gesture of goodwill, outside of the Act (therefore no recourse for complaint) I can summarise as follows which has been provided by colleagues:

When a force puts on a Lost or Stolen (LOS) report – unless there is a Crime or other Police Reference, this will be logged as ‘unconfirmed’ where the circumstances are not yet fully known.

With an ‘unconfirmed’ LOS report, these will as has been raised by the originator be weeded off automatically at 6 weeks. Prior to this, at the 4 week mark the force will be notified by way of a Daily Action File (DAF) which will highlight an unconfirmed LOS Marker. Should no action be made on that repot it will be weeded 2 weeks later when the report has reached 6 weeks as not confirmed crime has taken place.

Should the circumstances be known and the marker is shown as ‘confirmed’ the entry will remain on the application for 6 years from the date of the original input. At each annual anniversary of the marker, the force will be notified by way of DAF that there is a LOS confirmed marker for the force to confirm this is still correct.

This annual review was added at the last review of the process (which was undertaken more than 5 years ago), prior to this, the DAF was sent on the 6 year mark advising weeding.

Yours sincerely

Sherry Traquair
Freedom of Information Officer & Decision Maker

The NPCC were thanked; the matter closed

23/08/2024 – to Jenny Sims NPCC vehicle crime lead re Weeding – no response

Aug 23, 2024 Philip Swift sent the following messages at 9:40 AM

Hi Jennifer,

thank you for connecting. I have noted the formation of a new vehicle crime taskforce (VCT)*. I will comment upon this later. However, I have made a request about ‘weeding’ – https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/pnc_vrm_los_weeding

I am concerned this process is causing unnecessary problems; that it is archaic, serves no good purpose and if abolished, could reduce police admin’. It appears to assist none, other than those who steal vehicles.

I have several suggestions about vehicle theft being concerned at the marked increase. I would welcome the opportunity to develop ideas to assist the police, victims, and their insurers.

Note: No reply received, but on 07/11/2024, the NPCC vehicle crime lead issued a circular (below).

09/10/2024 – Gwent Police ‘new process’

09/10/2024, Gwent police wrote:

it is common practice for the FCC to add the Stolen marker and confirm as stolen right at the point of contact which makes sense as this ensures records are updated correctly asap.

We’re going to move to this way of working from Monday 14/10 to ensure that we contribute to systems being updated asap and support apprehension of offenders of course. Staff are very welcome to start working this way as soon as they receive this briefing. (source)

The Gwent Police process failure

The above process was manual and ineffective, the timeline associated with the issues can be read here.

Following Gwent police’ misrepresentation to the ICO about the FoIA request history and the failure of Gwent to address suspected weeding matter, to include a 06/2026 issue, the matter is currently with a Gwent inspector for investigation.

07/11/2024 – the NPCC circular

Having written to the NPCC about the issue, Assistant Chief Constable Jenny Sims, NPCC Lead for Vehicle Crime (at that time) circulated for the attention of all Chief Constables:

I am writing to request your assistance in the correct recording of all stolen vehicle reports via the Police National Computer (PNC). This request is part of an ongoing effort to ensure the accuracy and completeness of PNC records in relation to stolen vehicles.

Initially when a vehicle is reported stolen, a Lost or Stolen (LoS) marker is placed onto the PNC, and at first appears as an “unconfirmed” report. The PNC then requires the report to be confirmed and the time taken to do this varies by force. Some forces show the vehicle as “Confirmed stolen” immediately, others do not. Once confirmed, the vehicle will be marked as “Confirmed stolen” on the PNC and the DVLA updated to reflect the vehicle status.

Until the report is confirmed the DVLA at Swansea are not notified of the theft*.

Any activity on the DVLA record of the vehicle in question would not be referred to Police for investigation during this time*.

All confirmed reports remain on PNC for a period of 6 years**, whereby any unconfirmed reports are automatically weeded out after 42 days.

An issue has been brought to my attention regarding vehicles that are remaining recorded as “unconfirmed stolen” effectively dropping off the PNC after the specified weed period causing an inaccurate record of the vehicle status.

Could I ask that you check within your force whether all stolen vehicle reports are recorded as “confirmed” as stolen within 24hrs*** and seek to address should this not be the case. This will ensure the PNC, third party data users and other agencies, such as DVLA, databases accurately reflect a vehicle’s stolen status.

Thank you for your continued support and I appreciate your cooperation and assistance with the matter.

29/08/2025 – Gwent police distortion – an FoIA request was not vexatious

Decision notice Reference: IC-355444-P4T3

Date: 29 August 2025

Public Authority: Chief Constable of Gwent Police

Gwent police acknowledged:

“While the subject of his enquiries is undoubtedly in the public interest, it is crucial to understand that the Force had already recognised the error and was in the process of amending the way it handles stolen vehicles on PNC prior to his request.”

The constabulary had recognized the error after I brought it to their attention. However, as evidenced by further instances of weeding, the issue had not been addressed – nor has it to this day!

However, in addition to the ICO finding against Gwent police, the ICO rightly noted that whilst Gwent cited eight requests to support their position, the ICO documented the facts:

Regarding the question of ‘overlapping’ and the frequency of requests, the Commissioner is not persuaded by Gwent Police’s arguments.

Whilst there may be some overlap, the actual numbers of FOI requests are minimal relating to three separate requests over the seven month period.

Additionally, Gwent Police failed to provide the Commissioner with other supporting information relevant to the complainant’s other requests that were dealt with by the Information Team.

Adding:

The Commissioner also considers that it was reasonable for the complainant to request an internal review as Gwent Police did not fully address the scope of the request in its initial response

250829 ICO & Gwent Police

Gwent police did not appeal the finding, has not challenged their misrepresentationd

09/2025 – from the NVCRP & the national Lead re WEEDING

From: Mark Kameen <@nvcrp.com>
Sent: 12 September 2025 10:14
To: P Swift
Subject: Re: ‘Weeding’

Good morning Philip – This is simply a courtesy email to keep you informed that the matter you raised is being progressed. I am in contact with the national lead. I am going away for almost three weeks now and therefore I wanted to just drop you a line to say that the matter has not been forgotten. I will update you when I return to duty and have the necessary responses

Kind regards

Mark

Mark Kameen
NVCRP Project Lead
Safer Business Network CIC

18/11/2025 LinkedIn article – ‘LoS Vehicles and the Day 43 Dilemma’

The article can be read here.

Prompting this article … a recidivist constabulary’s (Gwent police) Officer, responsible for their 2024 ‘fix’, wrote in respect of another ‘recovery’ (11/2025)occurring at or about the 43rd day, wrote:

‘We no longer use the unconfirmed as you are aware and LOS are placed on PNC confirmed from the offset’

However, their head of information services subsequently advised:

Given the timeframe between the PNC update on [redacted], this would indicate that the report was Unconfirmed by the FCR Operator at the material time.
Unconfirmed LOS reports are automatically weeded from PNC after 6 weeks

02/12/2025 to the NVCRP seeking an update

From: P Swift
Sent: 02 December 2025 11:33 AM
To: Mark Kameen <@nvcrp.com>
Subject: RE: ‘Weeding’

Mark

Is there any update on this?

A recidivist constabulary, who had apparently put a ‘fix’ in place is yet again he subject of my attention for failing to CONFIRM a LoS marker … just how many stolen vehicles are not recorded on PNC and at the DVLA as such due to this unnecessary, archaic, process? At any one time, the recovery rate is being skewed by the conduct.

Will the new LEDS system that will incorporate / replace the PNC, due out in March 2026, eliminate the possibility of this occurring?

Regards

02/12/2025 – From the NVCRP – another reminder? 12 months?

From: Mark Kameen <@nvcrp.com>
Sent: 02 December 2025 13:33
To: P Swift
Subject: Re: ‘Weeding’

Good afternoon Phil,

I have spoken to several individuals regarding the points you raised in your email in August regarding the PNC weeding process for LoS vehicles. As a result of this the following actions have been undertaken –

A reminder is being sent to all forces, via the DCC who has responsibility for the PNC portfolio, instructing forces to confirm LoS within, ideally the golden hour, but nonetheless within 72hours.
This will ensure the vehicle stays confirmed LoS for 12 months before being reviewed.
If for any reason the force doesn’t respond to that review, it continues on for another 12 months in any event.
The NPCC Operational vehicle crime lead will brief the National lead and arrange for a communication to be circulated regarding this on Chiefsnet to ensure awareness is raised regarding this issue

I can’t comment on whether, or why, some reports may be slipping through the process net, but I hope the above helps to improve the situation

Best wishes

Mark

Mark Kameen
NVCRP Project Lead
Safer Business Network CIC

02/12/2025 to the NVCRP

From: P Swift <
Sent: 02 December 2025 3:18 PM
To: Mark Kameen <@nvcrp.com>
Subject: RE: ‘Weeding’

Thank you … do you know if LEDS will address weeding, negate it?

I appreciate that the issue has been revisited and that further communications will be circulated nationally. However, I am concerned the proposed measures largely mirror the same reminders and guidance issued last year, which unfortunately did not prevent further LoS markers from falling away.

The most recent case we encountered demonstrates that the problem persists despite previous communications and despite certain forces having already acknowledged the need to confirm LoS records immediately at creation.

This reinforces the underlying point:

any process that relies on manual intervention, reminders, or individual operator attention will remain vulnerable to human error, staff turnover, and capacity pressures.
The outcome is predictable and recurring: LoS records are being weeded after 6 weeks and vehicles continue to disappear from both PNC and DVLA systems while still stolen.

This presents several operational and public-confidence risks:

When a LoS report falls away, the VRM is no longer treated as stolen on PNC or DVLA, giving the appearance of recovery when none has occurred.
We are often the first to identify the issue, and must then advise victims to contact their force, causing avoidable distress and reputational damage to the constabulary concerned.
The DVLA confirms that they cannot readily identify when a LoS notification was received, meaning any activity during the “unconfirmed” window is not visible externally.
In the most recent example, multiple opportunities to confirm the LoS within 48 hours, at the two-week reminder, and again prior to weeding were missed. The force later attributed this to the departure of an individual operator — which, if correct, highlights the fragility of a process dependent on individual staff members rather than system design – though the casual approach to formal access to PNC is troubling

Given these ongoing failures, and the fact that at least one force has already adopted the practice of confirming LoS at point of creation, it appears increasingly clear that the confirmation requirement — and the resulting Day-43 weeding mechanism — is unnecessary.

Its removal would eliminate the administrative burden caused by reminders, remove the risk of inadvertent deletion, and materially improve the integrity of national LoS data.

I am preparing communications for insurers and victims advising them to re-check VRMs on Day 43 due to the current unreliability of LoS persistence.

I would greatly prefer not to take this step, but accuracy is essential. I am also drafting a standard request to both police forces and the DVLA seeking the date each LoS report was confirmed and any DVLA activity between the date of theft and the date confirmation reached their systems.

The situation we observe through the relatively small number of thefts we manage suggests that the cases we identify are likely only a fraction of the wider problem.

I am grateful for the engagement on this issue and hopeful that the above detail assists in understanding why a systemic correction – rather than continued reliance on reminders – is necessary. I would be pleased to support further discussion on solutions that remove the need for confirmation altogether.

Currently the integrity of the DVLA and PNC databases are undermined. But this is the case with much of what is reported … no one can make informed comment and this needs to be addressed.

Regards

02/12/2025 – from the NVCRP – cannot take this matter further

From: Mark Kameen <@nvcrp.com>
Sent: 02 December 2025 17:28
To: P Swift

Subject: Re: ‘Weeding’

Sorry Philip, I don’t know the answer to the LEDS question you pose.

I also note your concerns below, however this is as far as I can take this matter at this time. I have raised this at a national level and have been provided with the update that I have sent to you, but as I am no longer ‘in’ policing I can’t take this matter further.

03/12/2025 to the NVCRP – to whom has this been escalated?

From: P Swift
Sent: 03 December 2025 7:10 AM
To: Mark Kameen <@nvcrp.com>
Subject: RE: ‘Weeding’

Can you direct me to who can address the LEDS question and who could deal with weeding ‘at source’ (PNC bureau?) … this needs to stop and it is disappointing my concerns have been ignored for years.

I wish to give the police a chance to address this before I escalate the farcical position – undermines every figure about recoveries and will affect the number of stolen records. UK data is appalling without this added issue!

03/12/2025 from the NVCRP – do not know who is dealing/leading

From: Mark Kameen @nvcrp.com
Sent: 03 December 2025 09:21
To: P Swift
Subject: Re: ‘Weeding’

Sorry Philip but I don’t know who is dealing with it or leading on it.

As I mentioned below, I am now working outside of the police and therefore I’m not sighted on the details or leadership around the project I’m afraid.

Regards

03/12/2025 LinkedIn message to Sarah Grahame – Vehicle Lead NPCC

Sarah Grahame – Assistant Chief Constable local policing, Surrey Police, NPCC vehicle crime lead

Sarah, good morning. I am in touch with Mark Kameen (NVCRP) regarding various aspects of vehicle theft. I understand he has liaised with someone @ the NPCC (you?) regarding the issue of PNC LoS ‘weeding’ – rather than the NPCC circulate the issue (again), who is able to put a stop to it?

I can explain more if required – this may be sufficient link to ‘LoS Vehicles and the Day 43 Dilemma‘.

regards

29/12/2025 to the NPCC, Sarah Grahame – any developments?

Philip Swift 1:47 PM

Sarah, have their been any developemnts regarding ‘weeding’; the automatic 6-week removal of PNC LoS markers held against VRMs that are not ‘confirmed’?

regards,

Note: no reply was received

09/01/2026 – The Home Office, NPCC & Others Report Submission

Documents sent following a lack of attention by constabularies and the NPCC:

05/01/2026 – Summary: The Extent of Weeding
05/01/2026 – Has ‘weeding’ caused 1,000’s of stolen vehicles to not be recorded as such on the PNC or at the DVLA? – 33 pages report

09/01/2026 – Potential Systemic Under-Recording of Stolen Vehicles – exchange history

Sent to:

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Service (HMICFRS) – inviting HMICFRS to consider whether the operation and oversight of six-week automated deletion of PNC Lost/Stolen markers merits inclusion in inspection activity or thematic review.
The Home Office – seeking confirmation as to whether the Home Office intends to assess this issue.
The NPCC – seeking confirmation of the NPCC’s position on weeding
Gwent police – in furtherance of a request for information ‘UNCONFIRMED PNC LoS Markers for VRMs‘, currently the subject of Internal Review. The submission relates to the information sought and to the public-interest considerations engaged by the review.
The DVLA – to assist understanding of whether systemic upstream processes may be affecting the completeness of the DVLA’s register, upon which the public, industry, and government rely. Additionally, seeking confirmation the DVLA has visibility of confirmation-dependent data flows and whether any assurance or reconciliation exists where stolen-vehicle notifications are not received.
The ICO – for awareness; the information complements issues previously considered by the ICO regarding accuracy, transparency, and the public interest in the operation of vehicle-crime data systems.

25/06/2026 – The National Audit Office (NAO) response

Reference GF 3845-26

25 June 2026

Dear Mr Swift,

POTENTIAL SYSTEMATIC UNDER-RECORDING OF STOLEN VEHICLES

Your correspondence has been passed to me as the NAO Director responsible for the Home Office.

The NAO and the Comptroller & Auditor General (C&AG), who is head of the NAO, are both independent of government. Our functions are to audit and express an opinion on the accounts of government departments and other central government bodies, and to carry out examinations into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which government departments and other public sector bodies have used their resources.

I read with interest the information you provided and my team has met with an official at the Home Office to discuss the matter. As you set out, when a vehicle is reported as stolen to a local police force, an LoS marker is registered on the Police National Computer.

The LoS marker is initially labelled as unconfirmed, enabling police officers to conduct due diligence before confirming that a theft has occurred. At that point the status is changed to confirmed. Only once an LoS marker is labelled as confirmed is it included in the report available to the DVLA. If the report remains unconfirmed after 6 weeks, it is removed from the PNC – the process known as “weeding”.

These include data on the proportion of vehicles that, once stolen, are returned to their owners. The Office for National Statistics uses the Crime Survey to estimate the changing incidence of certain crimes over time. The data for vehicle theft, since 1981, are available in tables A1a and A1b here: Crime in England and Wales: Appendix tables – Office for National Statistics.

I do not intend to conduct further work on this matter at this time. However, given the importance of LEDS, it is possible we will consider the programme again in future.

Thank you again for bringing your interesting and informative research to our attention.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Tim Phillips,
Director, Home Affairs

Link to the response here.

17/07/2026 – Completion of the DVLA & Police LoS Notification Comparison

A table conveying the comparison of:

The Lost or Stolen (LoS) notifications the DVLA receives from the police, via the Police National Computer (PNC)
The crimes recorded by police constabularies in England & Wales.

The data is for the calendar year 2025 and covers all motor vehicle types (cars, vans, 2-wheeled vehicles, HGVs, etc.).

The data was sourced from:

the DVLA in a single Excel spreadsheet file. This is commonly cited vehicle theft data, as it is relatively easy to acquire; one request (of the DVLA), one response to monitor and information in a single format across all constabularies.
44 police constabularies to whom individual Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) requests were made, with varying results.

The table of figures can be found here.

In 2025, the DVLA received 87,452 vehicle LoS notifications, though 1,339 of these could not be associated with a constabulary (the DVLA advising this is how they receive the data). When compared with police records, the variation has been considered using:

Code 48 only, a total of 107,734, i.e. a difference of 20,282 records, or a variation of 18.83%

All codes, a total of 115,710, i.e. a difference of 28,258 records, or a variation of 24.42%

The 2025 Police & DVLA stolen vehicle data table

The data can be found here.

ATTEMPTING TO QUANTIFY THE PROBLEM

30/06/2026 – FoIA to the Home Office – NAO exchanges (8936)

Home Office FoI reference: 2026 08936

Via WhatDoTheyKnow.com – Please provide the following information.

**1. NAO / Home Office discussion**

Please provide records held by the Home Office relating to the discussion between the NAO and the Home Office concerning PNC Lost/Stolen “weeding”, including:

* meeting notes;
* agendas;
* briefings;
* speaking notes;
* readouts;
* emails arranging or following up the discussion;
* internal correspondence created in preparation for, or following, that discussion.

Please also identify the Home Office team, unit or directorate represented in that discussion. I do not seek the names of junior officials; job titles, business areas or directorates will suffice.

**2. Records supporting or qualifying the NAO account**

Please provide any records held by the Home Office which support, explain, qualify or discuss the position recorded by the NAO, namely that the PNC confirmation / six-week weeding process leads to the discrepancy between police and DVLA databases.

**3. LEDS remedial discussions**

Please provide records referred to by the NAO concerning discussions about whether the Lost/Stolen confirmation step should be removed, altered, replaced or redesigned within LEDS functionality.

**4. Reconciliation with previous Home Office FOI positions**

Please provide any record held by the Home Office which explains or reconciles:

a. the 2023 position that the Home Office did not hold information concerning weeded VRMs and acted as a processor in relation to PNC vehicle data;

b. the 2026 position that the Home Office sends a weekly report to forces, but the data in the report is not stored;

c. the NAO-recorded position that a Home Office official confirmed that the confirmation / weeding process causes the discrepancy between police and DVLA databases;

d. the NAO-recorded position that the Home Office is discussing with police forces whether to remove the Lost/Stolen confirmation step from LEDS.

If the Home Office considers any part of this request too broad, please provide advice and assistance under section 16 FOIA before refusing the request. I would be willing to narrow the request by date range, business area, document type or topic.

29/07/2026 8936 response/exchanges provided

Home Office– clarification/assistance – treated as a new request (8937)

FoI2026 08937

Dear Home Office,

I seek information held by the Home Office concerning PNC Lost/Stolen vehicle marker confirmation, six-week “weeding”, the police/DVLA stolen vehicle data discrepancy, and potential remedial action through LEDS.

The following is provided to assist in locating the relevant information

1. **FOI2023/04138**, in which the Home Office stated that it did not hold information concerning VRMs weeded from the PNC Lost/Stolen register, reinstatements, current weeded records, or information indicating the extent of the issue;

2. **FOI2025/17986**, in which the Home Office again stated that it did not hold weeding notification information, but also stated that it sends a weekly report to forces, while asserting that the data in that report is not stored;

3. the National Audit Office letter dated **25 June 2026**, reference **GF 3845-26**, which records that the NAO met a Home Office official to discuss PNC Lost/Stolen “weeding”. The NAO records that the Home Office is in discussions with police forces about whether the Lost/Stolen confirmation step should be removed from LEDS.

I do not seek personal data, VRM-level data, live operational intelligence, or information identifying victims, vehicles, officers or investigations

30/06/2026 – FoIA to the Home Office – DAF VE602 (9165)

DAF VE602 PNC LoS Weeding Reports to Constabularies

I am advised:

‘Home Office PNC Services generate and issue a weekly weeding/reminder report (DAF VE602 or similar) to police forces; and that this report includes statistical outputs relating to the number of vehicle records weeded, including distinctions between confirmed and unconfirmed reports’*

Please provide the last report (referred to above) or if not retained, please explain why not and provide the next available report with the date this was issues.

I anticipate this report will:

1. not provide VRMs
2. provide:
a. the date of theft report for each entry
b. separate 2 week & 6 week notifications
c. identify the constabularies concerned
d. be supplied in spreadsheet format – csv would be acceptable

I am seeking to ascertain the number of VRMs notified to constabularies as being potentially subject to weeding due to NOT being ‘confirmed’ at 2 and at 6 weeks.

I wish to be provided the information per constabulary.

if a separate report conveys the number of weeded matters , this would be appreciated.

Additionally, if there has been any recent consideration of weeding i.e. since 01/01/2026, this too would be appreciated. I do not need a copy of the PNC users manual – , section 9 deals with the matter

06/07/2026 – clarification to the Home Office re FoIA 9165

Further to my request, I understand:

1. the National Audit Office has raised the issue with the Home Office
2. The Home Office is discussing with police forces whether the Lost/Stolen confirmation step should be removed from LEDS, the replacement system for PNC.

The Home Office has indicated that operational matters concerning PNC Lost/Stolen markers, weeding, completeness of police-held stolen vehicle data and associated assurance activity sit with the NPCC. I understand that day-to-day operational use of PNC may sit with police forces and/or NPCC structures. However, it is difficult to reconcile a simple “NPCC matter” position with the NAO’s account that a Home Office official was able to confirm the mechanism, confirm the cause of the discrepancy, and explain that the Home Office is discussing with police forces whether the Lost/Stolen confirmation step should be removed from LEDS.

The Home Office does send a weekly report to forces. That appears to engage more than local operational policing. It concerns national system design, PNC / LEDS functionality, DVLA-facing data flows, data integrity, crime statistics and public protection.

It also appears relevant that the Home Office issues or maintains PNC user material – for example, the PNC User Manual. If the Home Office has a role in the manual, the system, LEDS replacement functionality, or the national technology framework within which this process operates, then it appears there is a substantial interest in 6-week weeding and its consequences

29/07/2026 – Home Office FoIA response – referral to the NPCC

The online response can be read here.

The Home Office explained:

The Lost/Stolen reports are created by police users in an unconfirmed state on PNC and, after two weeks, the force owner will be sent a reminder notification. This is by batch job VE602J.

If the report is still unconfirmed six weeks after creation, then the report is weeded from the PNC.

DVLA is not notified of a lost/stolen report until it’s been confirmed, but this was by design, i.e. DVLA did not want to update their system until it was certain the vehicle was lost/stolen, which is the role of the confirmation process. It is therefore a difference, but not a discrepancy, and there is no basis for any remedial action.

There was some misunderstanding here regarding the storage question, and so it was not correct for us to say that the report notifications are not stored. The report notifications created by VE602J each week and sent to forces are archived, and so the last four runs are stored.

However, as stated in our response to FOI2023/04138 of 31 October 2023 the Home Office acts as a processor in relation to vehicle data on the PNC. Any information we hold is held on behalf of the police forces that use the system and therefore does not fall within the scope of the FOI Act.

Given the subject matter of your request, the National Police Chiefs’ Council may be able to assist you. Contact details can be found on the NPCC website at – LINK.

In line with our response to your concurrent request FOI2026/08936, we are providing a link to the PNC Manual, which can be found at the following link:

PNC User Manual 24.01 – 10/2024

In section 9.5 and 9.6 you will find information in relation to Lost/Stolen “weeding”.

Section 21(1) of the FOIA exempts the Home Office from having to provide you with this information, as it is already readily accessible to you.

29/07/2026 to the Home Office – seeking an Internal Review

Dear Home Office,

Freedom of Information Act 2000 – Request for Internal Review

Reference: FOI2026/09165

I request an Internal Review of the response dated 29 July 2026.

Whilst I appreciate the prompt reply, I do not consider that it adequately addresses the request or explains the legal basis upon which the information is said to fall outside the scope of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”).

The response simply states:

“The Home Office acts as a processor in relation to vehicle data on the PNC. Any information we hold is held on behalf of the police forces that use the system and therefore does not fall within the scope of the FOI Act.”

That statement is presented as a conclusion rather than an explanation. I respectfully submit that it does not sufficiently address the nature of the information requested or the statutory test under the Act.

1. The request concerns a nationally generated report, not vehicle records

My request was not for access to individual PNC vehicle records or personal data.

It sought a copy of the weekly DAF VE602 / VE602J report, or an explanation as to why such a report could not be provided.

The report itself is a nationally generated operational output concerning the administration of the Police National Computer (PNC) weeding process. It is distinct from the underlying vehicle records from which it is generated.

The response does not explain why such a report should itself be regarded as information held solely on behalf of police forces.

2. The response does not address the statutory test under section 3 FOIA

The relevant question under section 3(2)(a) FOIA is whether information is held by a public authority – otherwise than on behalf of another person.

The response instead relies upon the statement that the Home Office “acts as a processor”.

Whilst that may accurately describe aspects of the Home Office’s role in relation to PNC data, it does not of itself explain why every item of information generated by the Home Office in operating the PNC should automatically fall outside FOIA.

The response contains no explanation of:

* why the VE602 report is considered to be held solely on behalf of police forces;
* whether the Home Office holds or accesses the report for any purpose connected with operating or administering the PNC;
* whether the report exists independently of the underlying vehicle records;
* whether the report is created, formatted or distributed by Home Office systems or staff; or
* why the report itself should be regarded as information belonging exclusively to police forces.

These issues appear central to determining whether section 3(2)(a) applies.

3. Subsequent information obtained from the Metropolitan Police Service

Following submission of my request, I obtained further information from the Metropolitan Police Service concerning VE602J reports.

The MPS confirms that:

* VE602J reports are generated by the Police National Computer;
* they are operational prompts distributed routinely;
* they support nationally configured retention and weeding rules;
* responsibility for action rests with local record owners; and
* no central statistical monitoring is undertaken by the MPS.

The MPS response materially improves understanding of the report’s nature and purpose.

It also demonstrates that VE602J is not simply a collection of vehicle records. Rather, it is a nationally generated operational report supporting administration of the PNC weeding process.

That makes it all the more important that the Internal Review explains why such a report is regarded as being held solely on behalf of police forces.

4. Generation of the report

The PNC User Manual (to which my request referred indirectly) describes VE602J as a scheduled batch process which:

* generates reminders;
* deletes reports due for weeding; and
* produces statistics detailing the number of confirmed and unconfirmed reports weeded.

The existence of a scheduled process that generates operational reports and statistical outputs raises obvious questions as to:

* who controls the batch process;
* who determines the report format;
* who determines its content;
* who issues the report to forces; and
* who may access it prior to distribution.

These are matters which appear directly relevant to determining whether the report is held solely on behalf of police forces.

The response does not engage with those questions.

5. The distinction between underlying data and generated outputs

I fully appreciate that the Home Office may process police-owned PNC vehicle data on behalf of police forces.

However, that does not necessarily resolve the status of operational reports generated by Home Office PNC Services as part of operating the national PNC infrastructure.

My request concerns the latter.

The Internal Review should therefore explain why a nationally generated operational report falls outside FOIA rather than simply relying upon the status of the underlying operational data.

6. Advice and assistance

If, following review, the Home Office maintains that VE602 reports are indeed held solely on behalf of police forces, I would be grateful if the Internal Review would explain:

* who is regarded as the legal holder of those reports;
* which organisation is responsible for determining whether they may be disclosed; and
* why the National Police Chiefs’ Council has been suggested as the appropriate authority, given that the report is generated through operation of the PNC and issued by Home Office PNC Services.

This would greatly assist in directing any future request to the correct authority.

Conclusion

My concern is not simply whether disclosure should be made.

Rather, it is that the response provides no substantive explanation of why a nationally generated operational report, produced and issued as part of the administration of the Police National Computer, is said to fall outside the scope of FOIA solely because the Home Office acts as a processor in relation to PNC vehicle data.

I therefore respectfully request that the Internal Review reconsiders the response and, in particular, addresses:

* whether VE602/VE602J reports are themselves held by the Home Office for any purpose connected with operating the PNC;
* the factual and legal basis upon which section 3(2)(a) FOIA is considered to apply; and
* whether any part of the requested report, including any statistical or administrative information, can properly be disclosed.

Annotation left on WDTK (29 July 2026) NPCC approach made here:

29/07/2026 – FoIA to the NPCC – VE602

FoIA request of the NPCC

Dear National Police Chiefs’ Council,

The Home Office has advised, in response to FOI2026/09165, that it generates and issues VE602 (VE602J) vehicle weeding reports but considers those reports to be held on behalf of police forces.

Link to the Home Office response.

The Home Office has suggested that the NPCC may be able to assist in relation to these reports.

I therefore seek the following recorded information held by the NPCC.

1. Please provide any information which records, describes or explains whether the NPCC receives, accesses or retains VE602 / VE602J reports generated by the Police National Computer.

2. Please provide any recorded information held by the NPCC derived from, summarising, analysing or otherwise referring to VE602 / VE602J reports, including any statistical, management or assurance information.

3. Please provide any policy, guidance, governance documentation, terms of reference, meeting minutes, memoranda, reports or other recorded information describing the NPCC’s role (if any) in the governance, assurance or oversight of the VE602 / VE602J process or the associated vehicle weeding process.

4. If the NPCC does not undertake such governance or oversight, please provide any recorded information identifying the organisation or authority responsible for national governance or assurance of the VE602 / VE602J process.

If the NPCC holds VE602 / VE602J reports,

5. please provide the most recent report, suitably redacted if necessary. If the report is withheld, please identify the exemption(s) relied upon and explain why they apply.

For clarity, this request is confined to governance, process and organisational responsibility. It does not seek personal data or individual vehicle records.

Yours faithfully

05/08/2026 NPCC Response – cites s14

NPCC cite s14 – ‘vexatious’ as follows:

Section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 requires the NPCC, when refusing to provide information by way of exemption, to provide you with a notice, which, (a) states that fact (b) specifies the exemption in question, and (c) states why the exemption applies. In accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000 this letter acts as a refusal notice for your request.

The Freedom of Information creates a statutory right of access to information held by public authorities. Section 1(1) of the FOI Act provides that any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled:

(a) To be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the specified in the request, and
(b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.

That right of access to information is not without exception and is subject to a number of exemptions and other provisions under the Act, including Section 14(1) which provides:

Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.

Section 14(1) the legislation -seemingly boilerplate text:

(1) Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.

Under Section 14(1) of the Act, public authorities do not have to comply with vexatious request. There is no public interest test and no requirement to provide any information or confirm or deny whether the information is held.

Section 14(1) may be used in a variety of circumstances where a request, or its impact on a public authority, cannot be justified.

The term ‘vexatious’ is not defined in the legislation in ICO vs Devon County Council & Dransfield the Upper Tribunal defined the purpose of Section 14 as ‘…must be to protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA….’.

The Tribunal commented that vexatious could be defined as the ‘manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of a formal procedure’. The Tribunal’s definition clearly establishes that the concepts of proportionality and justification are relevant to any consideration of whether a request is vexatious.

To identify and deal with a vexatious request the ICO suggests that there are some typical key features of a vexatious request and four broad themes:

The burden (on the public authority and its staff;
The motive (of the requester);
The value or serious purpose (of the request); and
Any harassment or distress (of and to staff).

The ICO states that the key test to determine whether the request is likely to cause a disproportionate or unjustified level of disruption, irritation or distress. A starting point is to assess the value or purpose of the
request. When considering the issue the Upper Tribunal in Dransfield asked itself, “Does the request have a value or serious purpose in terms of there being an objective public interest in the information sought?”
(paragraph 38). The public interest can encompass a wide range of values and principles relating to what is in
the best interests of society, including, but not limited to:

Holding public authorities to account for their performance;
Understanding their decisions;
Transparency; and
Ensuring justice.

When considering the amount of work that would be involved in dealing with a request and whether it would impose an unreasonable burden, the NPCC takes into account the level of resources available. There are two NPCC FOI Decision Makers and the threshold at which the burden becomes grossly oppressive is lower than for a larger public authority with many staff.

It is common for a potentially vexatious request to be the latest in a series of requests submitted. The greater the number of requests received, the more likely it is that the latest request is vexatious. This is because the collective burden of dealing with the previous requests, combined with the burden imposed by the latest request, becomes a tipping point, rendering the latest request vexatious.

In addition, the pattern of request is overwhelming with numerous requests made in quick succession. Requests are submitted before the NPCC has had the opportunity to respond to previous requests. The Upper Tribunal in Dransfield said:

“A requester who consistently submits multiple FOIA requests or associated correspondence within days of each other, or relentlessly bombards the public authority with e-mail traffic, is more likely to be found to have made a vexatious request” (paragraph 32).

The ICO provides advice on Duration. Where requests have been submitted over a long period, possibly years, this may indicate that requests will continue to be made in the future. Therefore, even if the latest request appears entirely reasonable, when viewed in isolation, you may take into account the anticipated burden of those future request when assessing burden.

It is also recognised that a request which is the latest in a series demonstrating obsessive behaviour can have the effect of harassing staff due to the collective burden they place on staff.

In Rod Cooke vs IC EA/2018/0028 23 July 2018 the Tribunal considered requests made to Kirby Cane and Ellingham Parish Council regarding a dispute over the ownership of a certain piece of land. When looking at any harassment or distress caused to the parish council the Tribunal stated that:
“We do not find that the appellant has deliberately harassed or caused distress to the Council members or clerk. Nonetheless, we note that there has been a considerable volume of correspondence over a number of years directed at a single issue. In the context of a small council run by volunteers and a part time clerk, we find that the burden of dealing with this matter would potentially cause a feeling of harassment and distress to the individuals involved.” (paragraph 26).

Your request …

Your request relates to multiple similar requests previously received from you. The below have all been received in relation to stolen vehicles.

425/2024 – Weeding of PNC Lost or Stolen (LoS) Records
426/2024 – ACRO LoS Notifications
450/2024 – IR of 426/2024
012/2025 – IR of 425/2024
014/2025 – PNC LoS Records Communication
039/2025 – IR of 14/2025 LoS Records Communication
044/2025 – ICO Appeal of 426/2025
093/2025 – PNC Inaccuracy & Disclosure of Vehicle Makes and Models
2022/2025 – PNC LoS 9VRM) Info
2233/2025 – NaVCIS PNC LoS Submissions
2236/2025 – Disclosure advice on LoS Vehicles
2255/2025 – Disclosure Advice on Vehicles Makes & Models
2266/2025 – NavCIS PNC LoS Submissions
2298/2025 – ICO Appeal
2838/2026 – Vehicle Theft Investigations
2859/2026 – IR of 2838/2026

The requests listed above have already generated a significant workload on the NPCC, not only within the FOI team but also within NaVCIS, which is only added to by this latest request.

In addition to the above, the time taken to discuss progress with your requests with Senior Management continues to be disproportionate to progressing other requests.

It is appropriate to highlight the Decision notice ic-387981-n0t4.pdf issued in November 2025, where the commissioner supported the NPCC’s decision to rely on Section 14 in almost identical circumstances.

Whilst acknowledging there is value in the accountability and transparency of public authorities, especially in relation to finance/funding, your repeated requests demonstrate a tendency towards unreasonable persistence on a particular topic the NPCC does not consider there is enough value in this to outweigh the collective burden of your requests.

Yours sincerely
Freedom of Information Officer & Decision Maker